

HEALTH INDUSTRY CYBERSECURITY

Operational Continuity - Cyber Incident (OCCI)

May 2022



About the OCCI Checklist

This Operational Continuity-Cyber Incident (OCCI) checklist is intended to provide a flexible template for operational staff and executive management to respond to and recover from an extended enterprise outage due to a serious cyber attack. Its suggested operational structures and tasks can be modified or refined according to an organization's size, resources, complexity and capabilities. It represents the best collective thinking of private-sector cybersecurity and emergency management executives of the HSCC Incident Response/Business Continuity (IRBC) Task Group of the Health Sector Coordinating Council's Cybersecurity Working Group (CWG). It is not associated in any way with any regulatory compliance program.

Development Process

As the IRBC Task Group was being stood up, it was clear that geopolitical tensions from the Ukraine-Russia conflict were introducing a higher threat level to the health sector, calling for heightened awareness and immediate preparations against potential disruptions to health delivery. Accordingly, through the IRBC TG the HSCC created this tactical checklist with an accelerated development cycle to anticipate the potential for an extended outage in the event of direct cyber-attacks or collateral fallout, and put it into the hands of our stakeholders as quickly as possible. This is a living document that can be refined using stakeholder feedback with operational experience.

Organization

This checklist is organized into role-based modules to align with the Hospital Incident Command System. Specific actions recommended for each role are enumerated in the left column of the table, not as a prioritized sequencing of actions, but for easy reference during review or execution.

As enterprises organize their cybersecurity and emergency management roles with varying structures, this checklist attempts to generalize as much as possible to scale and align with those variations. Users will naturally tailor this checklist to fit their specific organizational structures or may adopt some of the recommendations as new additions to their operating procedures.

The HSCC intends to review and update this reference as experience and recommended improvements dictate. We encourage stakeholders who have adopted some or all of the recommendation to provide about its use and help contribute to effective operational continuity procedures. Please send your comments at any time to: Feedback@HealthSectorCouncil.org.

About the Health Sector Coordinating Council

The Healthcare and Public Health Sector Coordinating Council (HSCC) is a coalition of private-sector critical healthcare infrastructure entities organized under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan to partner with and advise the government in the identification and mitigation of strategic threats and vulnerabilities facing the sector's ability to deliver services and assets to the public. The HSCC Cybersecurity Working Group (CWG) is a standing working group of the HSCC, composed of more than 320 industry organizations working together to develop strategies to address emerging and ongoing cybersecurity challenges to the health sector.

For more information about joining the HSCC as a healthcare entity, please visit https://healthsectorcouncil.org/contact/.

Response Guideline

Cybersecurity/Technology System Prolonged Massive Disruption or Outage

This checklist outlines recommended initial (first 12 hours) actions and considerations during cybersecurity incidents

Command positions should be activated as they are needed. If a command position is not activated, actions fall to the Incident Commander and can be delegated as appropriate. Position activation may depend on staff availability or the size and scope of the incident. Based on assessment by CIO, CISO, and senior leadership, incident command may be activated Threshold for activation:

A prolonged massive disruption meets or has the potential to meet any of the following:

- a. Patient safety and/or member service impacts
- b. Large-scale clinical workflow, patient care, and/or member service impacts
- c. Implementation of preventative defenses that could impact clinical workflow

	Consider activation of Cyber Insurance policy and procedures	
	Consider extortion components	
	Consider initiation of digital forensics/incident response (DFIR)	
	Gather invoices to support non-cyber-related claim file process	
	Complete other reporting requirements	
	 Provide notification to regulatory agencies as appropriate 	
2.3	CNO/CMO/Clinical Leader/Safety & Quality:	
_	Advise on issues with ethical implications	
	• Understand and communicate clinical impact(s) to inform waivers, contingency care or	
	Crisis Standards of Care activation	
	Coordinate with Medical Staff Office, Transfer Center, and Telehealth Services for needs	
	relative to rapid credentialing, privileging, and reduction/expansion of services	
	• Consider special populations, including pediatrics, transplant, behavioral medicine, etc.	
	Public Information Officer	
Role: Se	erve as the conduit for information to internal and external stakeholders, including site personnel, visitors and families, and	
	the news media, as approved by Cybersecurity, IS/IT Section Chief and the Incident Commander.	
3.1	Receive briefing from Incident Commander on situation and status	
3.2	Establish cadence for coordination with cybersecurity leadership or Med-Tech Specialist for	
	collaboration on internal and external communications	
3.3	If appropriate, activate crisis communication plan	
	Rapidly develop internal communication for approval by Incident Commander	
	 Identify an internal spokesperson and provide guidance as appropriate 	
	Establish a plan to communicate to current and oncoming staff	
	 Recommend operations section leverage local leaders for local guidance 	
	 Include providers in scope of communication 	
	• Note: consider that internal communication rapidly becomes external	
	Hospital leadership notification (may depend on size and scope of facility)	
	Develop talking points for staff in patient- or public-facing departments	
	 Note: this should include phone-related services 	
	Identify a mechanism and cadence for executive communication	
2.4	Consider communication to executives/board of trustees	
3.4	Work with Operations Section Chief and IT/IS Section Chief to support activation of redundant communications, if available	
	 If needed, collect contact information for command and general staff and create communication directory. 	
3.5	communication directory Develop <u>external</u> communication for approval by Incident Commander	
5.5	Prepare instructions for patients, family, and community members	
	 Consider alternate phone numbers to contact site services 	
	 Consider access to online records or tele-services 	
	 Consider the impact to internal Wi-Fi connectivity 	
	 Consider family members of onsite staff 	
	 Coordinate with Liaison and Cybersecurity to ensure external contact alignment and 	
	appropriate notification to approved partner(s)	
3.6	Collaborate with Cyber Security to develop a <u>media and PR strategy</u>	
	 Note: during a cybersecurity incident, providing information to the public may create 	
	additional vulnerabilities. If a criminal investigation is possible, coordination with law	
	enforcement will be required to identify what details may be disclosed	
	 Identify the scope of information that can be shared and to what audience 	
	Monitor social media and other media reports	

	Identify if and how information may be provided to media outlets
	Establish media staging area
	Liaison
4.1	Role: Function as the incident contact for the Command Center for representatives from other agencies.
4.1	Coordinate external partner communication with PIO, Med-Tech, IS/IT Section Chief
4.2	Note: if not activating Med-Tech Section, ensure coordination with Cybersecurity
4.2	Notify external agencies or partners as appropriate
	Emergency Medical Service (EMS)
	Local and state dispatch centers
	Municipal Emergency Management
	Government Agencies
	Health Department
	Healthcare coalition
4.3	Consider pursuit of disaster declaration
	Safety Officer
5.1	Role: Identify, monitor, and mitigate safety risks to patients, staff, and visitors during a prolonged large-scale outage Understand and address safety impacts based on incident. These may include:
5.1	
	Staffing
	Central and remote patient monitoring Talabaakh comises
	Telehealth services
	Duress/Distress/panic alarm/nurse call alerting buttons or systems
	Imaging (readability)
	Pharmacy (dispensing and safety checks in the ERM/ADM)
	Environmental controls
	 Refrigeration, temperature tracking Starily processing
	• Sterile processing
	 HVAC, humidity, air exchange Clinical image state labor shores are tissue
	 Clinical impacts to lab, pharmacy, tissue Margue (decedent management)
	 Morgue/decedent management
	Access control systems: physical access and CCTV
	Other network-reliant systems Tube system lab devices text paging radio repeaters
	• Tube system, lab devices, text paging, radio repeaters
	 Implement or activate analogue process(es) for safety reporting Dation cofety reporting
	 Patient safety reporting Employee safety reporting
5.2	 Employee safety reporting Prepare to receive external agencies direct to command center
5.2	
	Activate temporary identification and understand access controls
Polo: Do	Operations Section Chief evelop and recommend strategies and tactics to continue clinical and non-clinical operations for the duration of the incident
Kole: De	response and for recovery.
6.1	Activate downtime procedures
	 Identify safe, alternative processes for patient care based on technical outage
	Initiate downtime processes:
	 Utilize business continuity or downtime computers if available
	 Build paper charts for all patients using information printed from downtime
	computers or paper downtime forms.
	• Print critical service delivery information (e.g., patient charts, staff schedules,
	patient schedules)
	 Establish patient and specimen label process

	 Note: this could be an extended downtime (days or w 				
	procedures that need to be refined to support extend	ed downtime			
	 Establish or implement back charting criteria 				
	 Deploy strike teams to provide just-in-time training and regulatory requirements on 				
	downtime charting and documentation				
6.2	Activate business continuity plans for clinical and operational	services			
	Conduct ongoing assessment of impacts to				
	staff, space, supplies and equipment across: • Air	medical services			
	ED/Trauma Tel	ehealth			
	Critical Care Tra	nsfer Center			
	Acute Care Bel	havioral Health			
	Women's & Newborn On	cology			
	Surgical Services Tra	insplant			
	Pediatric Care Sta	ffing needs			
		appropriate section chief(s)			
6.3	Provide recommendations for scaling back services				
	 Non-urgent elective procedures 				
	Outpatient services				
6.4	Provide recommendations for delaying services				
	 Non-urgent elective procedures 				
	Outpatient services				
6.5	Provide recommendations for altering				
	Laboratory Services (e.g., test volumes, specimen pro-	cessing, outsourcing)			
	 Imaging Services (e.g., time-sensitive or emergent onl 	y)			
	Pharmacy Services (e.g., decrease outpatient services)			
	Rehabilitative Services				
	Planning Section Chief				
Role	<u>ole</u> : Oversee all incident related documentation regarding incident operations and planning; conduct planning meetings; prepare the Incident Action Plan (I/				
7.1	In collaboration with the Incident Commander, use the Planning				
/.1	1. Establish operational periods				
	2. Record incident objectives				
	3. Develop Incident Action Plan (IAP)				
	 Schedule and execute appropriate briefings and revie 	ws			
7.2	Receive and collate data from local team status forms				
<i>,.</i> _	Prioritize critical areas and needs				
	Develop situation report for command staff				
7.3	Contact local areas who did not report status				
7.4	Prepare for patient and personnel tracking in digital and printe	ed form			
	Staffing logs				
	Patient logs				
7.5	Prepare staffing plan and recommendations to support operat	ions			
	 Support staff may be needed to support the outage – 				
	 Consider experienced staff/champions skilled 				
	Consider extended needs which may require:				
	• Runners				
	• Transporters				
	 Nursing ratios 				
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	 Redeployment 	
	 Remote work: continuation vs. site needs 	
	 Onsite support: loss of telehealth or other services 	
	 Engaging Liaison section for external resource support 	
7.6	In collaboration with Operations Section Chief and PIO, develop process for contacting patients	
	and family regarding alterations to procedures and appointments	
	Finance Section Chief	
<u>Role</u> :	Monitor the utilization of financial assets and the accounting for financial expenditures; supervise the documentation of expenditures and cost reimbursement activities.	
8.1	Track costs, expenditures, and revenue impacts	
8.2	Develop contingency strategies for impacts to financial data	
	 Engage appropriate section chief(s) to communicate changes 	
8.3	Consider establishing a cost center specific to the incident	
8.4	Gather invoices to support non-cyber-related claim file processes	
8.5	Consider modifying restrictions for purchase card or corporate card limits	
8.6	Develop and communicate contingency strategies for impacts to retail or point-of-sale systems	
8.7	Facilitate contracting for other emergency support as needed	
8.8	Oversee manual payroll and timekeeping processes as needed	
8.9	Coordinate with outside vendors for delayed or manual payment processes	
8.10	Partner with Med-Tech Section on insurance and reimbursement documentation	
<u>Role</u> : O	Logistics Section Chief Irganize and direct the service and support activities needed to ensure material needs for the site's response to an incident are available when needed.	
9.1	Identify any potential disruptions to critical infrastructure and priority services	
9.2	Regularly evaluate electrical system performance	
	• Consider network-reliant systems (e.g., tube system, temperature controls, etc.)	
	• Deploy additional staff to manually monitor systems reliant on the network (HVAC,	
	humidity, etc.)	
	• If the fire suppression system is reliant on the technical network, activate a fire watch	
9.3	Partner with IS/IT to identify communication redundancies for:	
	• Translation services (services offered previously via telehealth may need to be brought on	
	site)	
	• Visitors, family members, clergy, or vendors (e.g., phone or video calls, end of life care)	
9.4	Ensure food and hydration is available; consider patients, staff, visitors, and command center	
9.5	Prepare for radio deployment:	
	Charge radios, batteries, and additional batteries	
	 Provide just-in-time training on radio use 	
	Oversee sign-out sheet to track all deployed radios	
9.6	Ensure adequate downtime supplies: paper, toner, pencils, pens, stationary, forms, etc.	
	Order additional supplies as needed	
9.7	Assess impacts to materials management and ordering processes	
	Implement manual inventory and ordering processes for supply chain management	
	Implement a manual process for distribution, supply chain, and redistribution of clinical	
	and operational supplies	
	Ensure availability of durable medical equipment	
	Ensure availability of oxygen	

	Ensure availability of pharmaceuticals
9.8	Deploy Environment of Care teams to evaluate contingency needs
	 Clinical Engineering/Health Technology Management
	Environmental Services
	Facilities/Maintenance/Engineering
	Industrial Hygiene
	Infection Prevention
	Security
9.9	Assess ability to source additional technical equipment for end users (laptops, tablets, etc.)
9.10	Redeploy excess staff to support operations
9.11	Establish Labor Pool or coordinated process to redeploy staff
	 Note: credentials and competency must be accounted for
	 Provide instructions for manual timekeeping
9.12	Identify staff resiliency resources (EAP, mental health, etc.) for extended incident support
	Intelligence (IS/IT) Section Chief
	by ide technical response, continuity, and recovery recommendations; partner with cybersecurity to inform incident
response	e decisions and activities. Coordinates intelligence and investigation efforts. Note: For this incident, this position should be filled with IS/IT professionals
If u	sing an internal unified command structure, consider removing Cybersecurity from Med-Tech Section and placing below
10.1	Address potential IS/IT/Cybersecurity staffing needs and establish staff rotation schedule
10.2	Address any qualifications or security clearance necessary based on incident complexity
10.3	Establish a cadence with cybersecurity for regular situation updates to inform command
	Communicate scope and severity of disruption
	 Identify and communicate upstream and downstream impacts
	 Support identification and implementation of safe, alternate processes
	 Assist with restoration of technology systems
10.4	Coordinate with Clinical Engineering/Health Technology Management to understand:
	• Impacts
	Data storage limits to inform downtime processes
10.5	Collaborate with Cybersecurity to understand scope of disruption and potential for cyberattack
10.6	Consider activating unified command with a cyber command structure (cyber, legal, exec) to
	collaborate on sensitive decisions. (Note: this may be achieved via the Med-Tech Section)
	Activate Cyber Insurance Policy and procedures
	Coordinate Legal and Risk Management activities
	Consider ransomware payment process
10.7	Identify the impact on the following systems:
	 Bedside care: monitoring, telemetry, pumps, nurse call
	 Building systems (e.g., tube system, temperature tracking, badge access)
	 Electronic health record (EHR)
	Emergency Department/Trauma Services
	 Imaging
	 Internet
	Intranet
	IS Infrastructure
	 Lab
	Network
	Revenue Cycle
	Surgical Services
	Telecom

10.8	At direction of CISO or Cybersecurity leader, consider proactive technical system(s) lockdown		
	Consider data center shutdown to prohibit spread		
	 Consider critical systems shutdown to reduce data breach risk 		
	Consider shutdown of vendor bi-directional VPN access		
	Consider shutdown of WAN connections		
	Consider lockdown of internal network segments		
	 Consider failover to DR, quarantine routers/switches 		
	Scan all backups for integrity		
10.9	Consider a recommendation to power down all technology to limit the spread		
	 Engage IS/IT to support network take down/recovery 		
	 Engage IS/IT in use of off-network computers for downtime process support 		
10.10	D Establish a process for interim solution, intake, and prioritization		
10.11	1 Provide updates to command staff on estimated length of time until systems can be fully		
	recovered (RTO/RPO in hours/days/weeks)		
10.12	Coordinate with Cyber Security on timeline for threat eradication		
	 Note: Reenabling internet/WAN/VPNs may not be possibly until threat is eradicated 		
10.13	Collaborate with Incident Command on restoration and recovery processes		
	 Note: this guide is for the first 12 hours; however, recovery should begin immediately 		
	Identify scope of encryption		
	Reaffirm recovery time objectives		
	Validate application recovery priority		
	 Assess critical application dependencies for recovery 		
	 Recover critical applications for essential business operations in a timely manner 		
	Recover infrastructure		

Acknowledgments

Once the initial scoping for this project was agreed upon by mid-March 2022, the following individuals volunteered as a "Strike Force" to develop this checklist on an accelerated timetable to prepare health delivery organizations and their support systems for the potential of an extended operational outage from a cyber attack. This group met 2-3 times per week over a four-week period to develop this checklist, solicit and adjudicate feedback and format it for ease of use. The HSCC is indebted to their thought leadership, energy and commitment to the operational health of the sector.

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